Jesus Vargas/Getty Images
Jesus Vargas/Getty Images
January 10 came and went and, as expected, Venezuelan autocrat Nicolás Maduro hung on to power. It is easy to throw our hands in the air and feel hopeless before an authoritarian government that ruthlessly persecutes any dissent. However, moments like these call for clear-eyed analysis. International actors must be reminded that the fight for human rights in Venezuela does not have an expiration date and that millions of Venezuelans, despite the unfair conditions, went to the polls last year, expressed their desire for a change, and continue to defend the right to elect their government. Despite all, a substantial civil society remains ready to fight (en pie de lucha) for democracy and human rights.
This piece examines Venezuela’s complex situation and provides insights into where Venezuela stands now and how democratic countries can contribute to finding avenues to support a peaceful transition in Venezuela.
Despite announcements of a pompous ceremony, Maduro was sworn in for another six-year term in a modest room in the Legislative Palace, rather than the traditional hemicycle. Only two Latin American heads of state accompanied him: Miguel Díaz-Canel of Cuba and Daniel Ortega of Nicaragua, along with the prime minister of Antigua and Barbuda, Gaston Browne. Maduro claimed representatives from 120 countries attended, but the list of attendees has not been disclosed. However, the press reported the presence of representatives from Russia, Iran, China, and Algeria.
Notably, the Colombian and Brazilian ambassadors, Milton Rengifo and Glivânia Oliveira,—along with the Mexican ambassador—attended the ceremony. The presidents of Colombia and Brazil declined the invitation citing concerns over the lack of transparency and fairness of the elections. President Lula has remained silent so far, while President Petro and Minister of Foreign Affairs Luis Gilberto Murillo, have emphasized that the elections were not free, however, they want to maintain relationships with Venezuela. The role of Colombia, neighbor and first receptor of Venezuelan migration, continues to be of utmost importance.
There is overwhelming evidence of the violations of local electoral laws and international standards, infringing Venezuelans’ right to political participation. The Carter Center and the United Nations Panel of Experts that sent credited missions to the July 28 elections have said so, as well as independent reports from the Colombian Electoral Observation Mission (MOE) and the Organization of American States (OAS), providing an account of the irregularities committed and the lack of credibility of the results announced by the National Electoral Council on the night of the election, granting Maduro 51.2 percent of the votes.
All serious analysts agree on who truly won the election. Yet, Maduro remains in Miraflores. Is his de facto government sustainable? While nobody can predict with certainty how long he will stay in power or what will happen to Venezuela, there are some elements of analysis to keep in mind:
Unpopularity: Maduro, who won the 2013 election with 50.61 percent of the vote— amid doubts about the quality of voting conditions,—saw his support plummet by over 20 percent in the 2024 election. With repression and violation of civil liberties, the collapse of public services, historic levels of inequality and poverty, and the fact that around 27 percent of the population has fled the country, Maduro has lost the popularity he once inherited from Chávez. As living conditions in Venezuela remain dire, it is unlikely that he will be able to grow his support base.
Brutal repression as a means to hold on to power: following July 28, at least 25 people have been killed, over 2,000 people have been arbitrarily detained and 1,697 remain imprisoned. Authorities have also committed acts of torture and carried out enforced disappearances. The severity of the human rights violations committed has led the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights to classify them as practices of state terrorism and the UN Fact Finding Mission has reached the conclusion that these actions are part of a policy of political persecution that amounts to crimes against humanity. Just in the period between January 1-12, 2025, 83 people have been arbitrarily detained, including former presidential candidate Enrique Márquez, Rafael Tudares—son-in-law of Edmundo González Urrutia—and prominent human rights defender Carlos Correa, who was released from prison on January 16, eight days after being detained and disappeared.
In anticipation of this moment, at the end of 2024, the National Assembly approved the Simón Bolívar Law and the Law of Supervision, Regularization, Performance and Financing of Non-Governmental and Related Organizations. These two laws, now in force, along with the looming threat of others like the proposed Law Against Fascism, are part of a broader strategy to silence and persecute civil society and close civic space.
In December, authorities carried out a rush election of almost 30,000 “peace justices”, a figure under Venezuelan laws meant to “promote conflict resolution at the community level”. Although similar figures exist in other countries, experts warn that in Venezuela the communal peace system is used to persecute dissent and this could have implications in future elections. Maduro has also announced plans for a constitutional reform, and the National Assembly has advanced discussions to introduce reforms to electoral laws, but the scope of these reforms is yet unknown. These measures, along with the same National Electoral Council and without having clarified what happened with the July 28 election, would make it impossible for there to be room for competitive elections, in a year when legislative, local, and regional elections are due.
Persecution of former regime supporters: Persecution against his own former political allies—something that had been going on for some time – has increased, as two recent examples show: María Alejandra Díaz, a lawyer and activist of the Frente Democrático Popular, and Juan Barreto, who was mayor of Caracas and a strong supporter of Chávez. They have been threatened and harassed by security forces, and have been mentioned on national television by Diosdado Cabello. This type of persecution, however, is not new. Since March of 2023, at least 66 people very close to Nicolás Maduro have been detained under corruption charges in the case known as “PDVSA-Crypto”, including former ministers, senior officials, and members of the military. This persecution could create more discontent and open opportunities for coordination with democratic forces, but it could also de-mobilize and paralyze due to fear created by these and other exemplifying cases.
Signals of dissent within the military: In Venezuela, the military is in charge of guarding the electoral material under an operation called Plan República, therefore they know the truth of what happened during the elections. Also, those that are not part of the corrupt elite, are suffering the same dire economic and humanitarian conditions as the rest of the country.
There is documentation of 162 members of the military currently imprisoned for political reasons. This indicates that there is discontent and divisions within the military and that Maduro needs to inflict fear to keep them under control. Now, are divisions within the military at a medium or high level? What are the ranks of these imprisoned officials? How deep are these fractures? This is very hard to assess in a context of absolute hermeticism and brutal political persecution. It is therefore impossible to determine the probability of success of a theory of change that relies solely on the collapse of the regime from within.
International isolation: The blatant manner in which a dictatorship has been consolidated has created more international isolation. On January 6, Venezuela broke diplomatic relations with Paraguay. Last year, after the presidential elections, Maduro expelled diplomats from seven countries in the region (Argentina, Chile, Costa Rica, Peru, Panama, the Dominican Republic, and Uruguay) and temporarily suspended commercial flights to and from Panama and the Dominican Republic.
After the inauguration of January 10, new individual sanctions upon officials and supporters of the government were issued in a coordinated manner by the United States, Canada, the European Union, and the United Kingdom.
Although not ideal, Maduro’s government has shown that it is willing to isolate itself on the international stage while strengthening ties with like-minded governments. In response to new sanctions and to the decision made by the EU governments not to send representations to the inauguration, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs announced its decision to limit the number of diplomats accredited to the embassies of France, Italy, and the Netherlands in Caracas to three, as well as restrict their capacity to move within the country. The unanswered questions are what the U.S. approach will be under Donald Trump and what the future holds for the oil licenses.”
Dire economic and humanitarian conditions: Although there had been a slight increase in Venezuela’s GDP between 2021 and 2023, according to the Venezuelan Observatory of Finances, 2024 closed with an inflation of 85 percent and, just in December, food prices increased by 16.4 percent. According to HumVenezuela (Final Report on Community Diagnostics, 2024), in 2024, 86.9 percent of the population lived in poverty, 70.6 percent in extreme poverty and 14.8 percent of households did not have a minimum budget to provide food for their families. Public services including health, education, water, sanitation, transportation, and electricity have collapsed and remain unavailable for the majority of the population.
These elements paint a picture of the difficult challenges that Maduro has ahead to hold on to his de facto regime. However, the government has repeatedly demonstrated its ability to remain in power illegitimately through a combination of political repression, control over state institutions, and the manipulation of negotiation processes. These mechanisms have so far allowed the regime to withstand both internal dissent and international pressure.
Venezuela’s case is one for the books. There has been almost generalized international condemnation of Maduro’s swearing-in without evidence that backs up his alleged election victory. The United States, the European Union, the United Kingdom, Canada, Japan, and governments in the region ranging from Nayib Bukele in El Salvador and Javier Milei in Argentina to Gabriel Boric in Chile and Bernardo Arévalo in Guatemala, have all stood united in their rejection of Maduro taking office and in their support to democratic forces.
In this context, there is plenty that can be done by other governments, their justice systems, and international bodies like the UN to support efforts for democratic change. This ranges from countermeasures like individual sanctions and asset freezing to launching investigations of human rights abuses and corruption, in order to tackle impunity for Venezuelan officials at a global level.
At the same time, and as a reflection of the frustration after January 10, ideas of military interventions have once more surfaced. For example, Colombian ex-president Álvaro Uribe said: “We call for an international intervention, preferably endorsed by the United Nations, to remove those tyrants from power and to immediately convene free elections.” The very necessary limitations imposed by international rule of law, enshrined in the UN Charter, require us to take this opportunity to make a call for common sense: it is unrealistic and irresponsible to call for the use of force in Venezuela. Venezuelan civil society is unarmed and has insisted on the peaceful nature of its resistance against authoritarianism. Moreover, the use of force can put the country in a far more difficult position in the long run. Magic solutions, while they gain political returns, contribute to two very counterproductive outcomes. They give arguments to Maduro to justify doubling down on the government’s brutal repressive practices against dissent and create a sense of fatigue within the international community, reinforcing the view that there is nothing left to be done.
There are valid reasons to question what the incoming administration’s approach will be, because there have been mixed signals. One consistent theme emphasized by both Trump and Secretary of State nominee Marco Rubio is that this administration will prioritize U.S. interests above all else under an “America First” foreign policy. What that means can have several interpretations, but based on what has already been said, the focus will be on curbing migration and reducing the influence of China and its allies in the region.
Since these priorities could conflict with the strong stance that they have had on the Venezuelan government in the past, there are questions about whether or not the Trump administration’s approach to the situation will be more pragmatic and transactional. After Trump’s victory, Maduro publicly congratulated him and expressed hope for a “win-win” relationship. Maduro will want to retain oil licenses granted by the Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC), which made Venezuela the third-largest U.S. oil supplier in 2024. At the same time, Trump’s border czar, Tom Homan, recently said that he expects that Trump “will work with Venezuela” in receiving these deportation flights. Nonetheless, it was Edmundo González Urrutia was invited by who Senator Rick Scott invited to Trump’s inauguration.
Rubio emphasized during his nomination hearing that the country is controlled by a drug trafficking and criminal organization, and highlighted the significant geopolitical risks involved in Venezuela’s dealings with countries like Russia and Iran. Rubio criticized the Biden administration for their approach to the issue:
“I was in strong disagreement with the Biden administration because they got played the way that I knew they would get played. They entered into negotiations with Maduro. He agreed to have elections. The elections were completely fake. They leveraged migration against us to get those concessions. And now they have these general licenses where companies like Chevron are actually providing billions of dollars of money into the regime’s coffers. And the regime kept none of the promises that they made. So all that needs to be re-explored.”
Finally, Richard Grenell, appointed to be a presidential envoy for special missions – including Venezuela – has not taken a public stance yet and it is unclear how his position will articulate with that of the State Department.
Venezuela is navigating uncharted waters, and no one has definitive solutions. But there are several factors worth considering: timing, coordination, and engagement. In terms of timing, the opposition must contend with Maduro’s scramble to enact a constitutional reform, rapidly close civic space, and potentially carry out legislative, regional, and local elections under profoundly unfair conditions. At the same time, they must be patient with the international community, particularly as the United States ushers in a new presidency with significant geopolitical implications.
Secondly, coordination—both internal and external—is key. Internally, the regime is exerting significant pressure on the opposition through arbitrary detentions and other human rights violations, making it difficult for the opposition to resist. The opposition, just like the government, is not monolithic. Opinions on the appropriate strategy vary widely, but the opposition must reach a unified position on the next steps in Venezuela and clearly define their demands from the international community, particularly the U.S. Externally, there is agreement that Maduro stole the election and that his assuming office should not be recognized, but the challenge is to coordinate a unified response from the international community on how to address the situation.
Finally, there is the question of engagement. Venezuela has time and time again cycled through periods of firm engagement from the international community during pivotal moments, followed by periods of lethargy and disinterest. In a complex geopolitical landscape, Venezuelans—already burdened with immense challenges—will need sustained and constructive engagement from key actors in the region, Europe, and North America, to find solutions that are feasible and aligned with international law.
